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ABSTRACT
Proponents of the Green State repudiate the historical antipathy to the state
from many in the green movement and endorse the pragmatic usage of
state capacity and legitimacy to realise environmental protection. This
article oﬀers a sympathetic critique of the Green State’s ﬁscal and
monetary institutional design in order to reﬁne the concept further. It will
investigate an under-theorised contradiction in the political economy of
the Green State; centring upon the operationalisation of an interventionist
state, moving beyond economic growth, and deference to the ceteris
paribus conventions of state ﬁnancing. It is argued that the three cannot
co-exist harmoniously, given the ramiﬁcations of moving beyond growth
for the ﬁscal capacity of the state. Therefore, there is a need to go further
than even Eckersley does in re-politicising and challenging capitalist
conventions. Speciﬁcally, Eckersley’s own critical constructivist approach is
invoked to interrogate the capitalist conventions that constitute the
constraints surrounding state ﬁnancing, such as the depoliticised
production of money and the viability of debt relations.
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Introduction
There are many dimensions to the Green State, but its fundamental political economy characteristics
can be deﬁned as the fusion between the belief in de-privileging Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth as a political objective and the utilisation of the state to ensure environmental protection
(Eckersley 2004, Christoﬀ 2005). Robyn Eckersley’s conception drew upon the strong ecological mod-
ernisation school of thought concerning the evident ecological and social issues with GDP growth as
well as the pragmatic appeal of employing the state’s capacity and legitimacy.
In her seminal work on the Green State, Eckersley stated explicitly that she envisaged it to be
largely post-capitalist. She posited that ‘a deep and lasting resolution to ecological problems can
… only be anticipated in a post-capitalist economy and postliberal democratic state’ (Eckersley
2004, p. 81). Her position on the topic later became more equivocal, as she herself conceded in
response to James Meadowcroft, stating that
I do not argue for the abolition of private ownership or wage labour but I do argue that the state should ecolo-
gically constrain and discipline capitalism in signiﬁcant ways… But how much does public power need to take
over from private power before we can describe the green state-society complex as post-capitalist? I’m not sure,
and I’m not sure it matters (Eckersley 2006, p. 134).
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However, when pondering whether a ‘full-ﬂedged Green democratic state’ would still be capitalist,
she does explicitly designate an area where conventional capitalist practices would continue.
Namely, in the area of state ﬁnancing:
On the one hand, the green statewould still be dependent on thewealth produced by private capital accumulation
to fund, via taxation, its programmes and in this sensewould still be a capitalist state. On the other, securing private
capital accumulation would no longer be the deﬁning feature or primary raison d’être of the state. The state would
be more reﬂexive and market activity would be disciplined, and in some cases curtailed, by social and ecological
norms. The purpose and character of the state would be enlarged and therefore be diﬀerent. In this respect, the
green democratic state may be understood as a postcapitalist state (Eckersley 2004, pp. 83–84).
Growth is often depicted as an addiction, a myth or an unnecessary ﬁxation by the green movement
which tends to ﬁx its analytical focus on the private rather than the public sector. Yet the de-privile-
ging or ending of growth will also have ramiﬁcations for the ﬁscal capacity of the state (Bailey 2015).
This is because any suppression of economic activity – for that is what GDP is a measurement of – is a
suppression of taxable economic activity, and there are thus consequences for the ‘tax take’. The end
of growth advocated by strong ecological modernisation theorists therefore threatens to circum-
scribe the capacity of the state whilst simultaneously proposing an ‘enlarged’ interventionist role
for the state in protecting the environment. This constitutes a signiﬁcant paradox for the putative
Green State, if we are to insulate the constraints surrounding state ﬁnancing from reform.
As such, the political economy of the state as we move beyond growth remains theoretically
under-developed in the Green State literature. I will argue that we need to go further than even Eck-
ersley does in challenging the ceteris paribus assumptions of the capitalist system. Speciﬁcally, there is
a need to re-politicise the capitalist concepts that constitute the constraints surrounding the Green
State. This is necessary if the Green State is going to have the capacity presupposed by Eckersley and
also Christoﬀ in spite of de-privileging growth.
This trilemma betweenmoving ‘beyond growth’, the presupposition of a large interventionist state
and the constraints of state ﬁnancing will therefore be the focus of the analysis in this article. I will
argue that the notion of building an interventionist Green State is problematic whilst GDP growth
is being de-privileged, as long as we remain deferential to the existing constraints surrounding
state ﬁnancing (as Eckersley has suggested). This has been under-theorised in the existing scholarship.
I will begin by outlining the gestation and deﬁning political economy features of the Green State
concept. Thereafter, I will deliberate the ﬁscal ramiﬁcations of moving beyond growth. Finally, I will
utilise Eckersley’s own ‘critical constructivist’ approach and interrogate the capitalist concepts and
practices that constitute the constraints.
The Theoretical Development of the Green State
The historically dominant understanding of the state’s ontology among within the green movement
is of a hierarchical mode of domination over both humans and the natural world. The state is per-
ceived to be inextricably bound up with the interests of private capital and ecological destruction
(Paterson et al. 2006, p. 136). This understanding – inﬂuenced by both the anarchist tradition of
thought represented by Bookchin (1980, 1982) and Carter (2013) on the one hand, and orthodox
and revisionist Marxism which interprets the state as little more than an appended superstructure
to the infrastructure of capitalist production on the other (Poulantzas 1969) – has resulted in the ten-
dency of green scholars to renounce the state.
The growing movement to see the state instead as a potential site of environmental protection,
given its legitimacy and unparalleled capacity to enact change as the conventional modality of
power, has been spearheaded by a cadre of academics including Robyn Eckersley, James Meadow-
croft and Carl Death. In recent years, Duit et al. (2016, p. 2) in a Special Issue of Environmental Politics
entitled ‘Green Leviathan? The emergence of the Environmental State’ called for the need to ‘bring
the state back in’ to the ﬁeld of environmental politics. This reﬂected an earlier period of interested in
the mid-2000s when Barry and Eckersley (2005, p. 255) argued that we needed to chart a course
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between ‘naïve antistatism and naïve statism’ which had both failed ‘because they lack any sense of
context and historical dynamics in the political economy’. Eckersley’s normative ideal, which she
termed the ‘Green State’ (2004)1, combined with Meadowcroft’s focus on the actually existing devel-
opment of the state’s environmental management functions, part of an emerging ‘Environmental
State’ (Meadowcroft 2005a, p. 5), sparked a revival of interest in the capacities and limitations of
the state as an environmental actor. The inclination to view the state as a potential site of environ-
mental contestation was catalysed by the ‘global ﬁnancial crash’ of 2007/8 which instigated debates
on ‘green new deals’ and ‘green growth’ macroeconomic strategies; shifting the analytical focus in
green scholarship away from modernity, industrialisation, globalisation and capitalism (Saurin
1996, Kovel 2007, Smith 2011).
Eckersley proposed a pragmatic and instrumental approach to the state based on an immanent
critique of actually existing practices of governance. The utilisation of the state to serve purposes
of ecological protection reﬂects the approach of the German Green Party to ‘march through the insti-
tutions’ or, as Barry (2012, p. 150) puts it, to ‘dig where we stand’. The theoretical development of the
Green State’s central features has been driven by Peter Christoﬀ (2005), James Meadowcroft (2012),
John Barry (2012) and Arthur Mol (2016), addressing in particular issues of democratisation, sover-
eignty and the commitment to internationalism inter alia. Emerging from their analysis has been
the criteria for environmental performance to which states should aspire and be measured
(Christoﬀ and Eckersley 2011).
Peter Christoﬀ (2005) developed the conception by establishing a typology of Green States. At the
pinnacle of Christoﬀ’s typologywere thoseGreen States prioritisinggreen goals, such asmitigation and
adaptation policies, over any other governmental imperatives (including economic growth and
welfare spending). He wrote that ‘Green States, were they to exist, would be characterised by the pre-
dominance of types of state activity aimed at strongecologicalmodernisation’ (Christoﬀ2005, p. 41). As
the table below demonstrates, Christoﬀ believed that the ‘greener’ states were, the higher the budget-
ary commitment would be to ecological issues and the higher the levels of state capacity (Table 1).
Christoﬀ’s benchmarking of high levels of state capacity and prioritisation of green objectives in
budgetary decision-making echoes the writings of Eckersley (2004). These state qualities would
enable a state to mitigate and adapt to climate change, manage ecological resources, pool socio-
Table 1. Extracted from Peter Christoﬀ’s typology of environmental states.
Type of Green State Deﬁning features Examples
Green State Strong eco-modernisation through:
. High levels of state environmental capacity and intervention, and of integration
of economic, social welfare, and environmental welfare policies
. Strong cultural and political institutionalisation of ecological values
. High commitment to human welfare environmentalism
. Strong budgetary commitment to both human welfare environmental and eco-
centric issues
None currently
Environmental welfare
state
Weak eco-modernisation through:
. Moderate state environmental capacity and intervention
. Weak institutionalisation of ecological values, with human-orientated (social
and environmental) welfare predominant
. High commitment to human welfare issues
. Moderate budgetary commitment to ecological issues
Sweden,
Netherlands
Environmental
neoliberal state
Very weak eco-modernisation through:
. Weak state environmental capacity and intervention.
. Strong market-orientation
. Moderate to high commitment to human welfare environmentalism
. Weak to moderate budgetary commitment to social and environmental welfare
Australia, USA
Source: Christoﬀ (2005).
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economic and environmental risks, establish means of redistribution aligned to notions of social
justice, and be seen as broadly ‘green’.
Meanwhile, there are ample reasons for the Green State literature to embrace the strong ecologi-
cal modernisation commitment to moving beyond economic growth. For Eckersley (2004), this is
derived from a political ecology critique of cornucopian assumptions and the fetishisation of material
wealth. Even Meadowcroft (2012), who propounds a weaker version of ‘Ecological Modernisation’,
asserts that the future Eco-State must spell the end for economic growth as it becomes seemingly
incompatible with ‘planetary boundaries’. Barry and Eckersley (2005, pp. 260–263) went further
and argue that not only should a Green State de-prioritise growth, but that the ingrained governmen-
tal imperative towards economic growth represented the major obstacle to the Green State. The calls
to de-prioritise GDP growth are substantiated by the empirical evidence suggesting that the commit-
ment to ad inﬁnitum economic growth remains incompatible with environmental sustainability
(Jackson 2009, Rockström et al. 2009, Anderson and Bows-Larkin 2012, IPCC 2014). In spite of the
dominance of politically appealing ‘green growth’ or ‘sustainable development’ narratives which
purport to oﬀer us sustainability from within the parameters of the economic status quo, these dis-
courses continue to be based on little more than a faith in future technological innovations capable of
‘de-coupling’ economic output from ecological output to a greater extent than has so far been poss-
ible (Jackson 2009, Latouche 2009, Jackson and Webster 2016). This is to say nothing of the evidence
which suggests that growth no longer enhances social wellbeing in the post-industrial countries, and
may even detract from it (Kasser 2002, Layard 2005, Sen et al. 2008, Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). On
this basis of this evidence, it is unsurprising that transcending GDP growth has become a central
feature of the Green State concept.
However, the presumption of this fusion between large state capacity on the one hand and the de-
privileging of growth is contradictory if the ceteris paribus the constraints surrounding state ﬁnancing
are to be insulated from critique; something which Eckersley explicitly advocates2. Whilst the work of
Eckersley (2004) and Christoﬀ (2005) has been pivotal in driving the debate on the extent to which
more enlightened forms of governance could hypothetically play a role in facilitating environmen-
tally-conscious behaviour in the citizenry through prioritising ecological goals, the political
economy of the Green State nevertheless remains inchoate in the literature. Speciﬁcally, the existing
literature has paid insuﬃcient attention to the political economy of the state itself and the extent to
which the ﬁscal capacity of the capitalist state – upon which the Green State’s mitigation and adap-
tation projects would supposedly be predicated – would be compromised by moving beyond GDP
growth. It is this to which I now turn.
Living without the Fiscal Dividend of Economic Growth
Recognising the environmentally and socially problematic dimensions of economic growth and sen-
sitising policy-making to alternative metrics is not imprudent. However, there are repercussions of de-
prioritising GDP growth for the state, as well as for the practices of the private sector. Whilst those in
the green movement have been vocal in their opposition to austerity and state retrenchment since
the 2008 ﬁnancial crash (Lucas 2013, European Green Party 2015), moving beyond growth ceteris
paribus has severe and constricting ramiﬁcations for the ﬁscal capacity of the Green State.
As I have argued elsewhere (Bailey 2015), any move ‘beyond growth’ entails a suppression of
economic activity and thus taxable economic activity. The corollary of this is a ﬂat-lining of the ‘tax
take’ in the case of a transition to a ‘Steady State Economy’ and an incremental decrease in the
‘tax take’ in the case of a de-growth transition. As Paterson (2016, p. 479) notes, ‘if the Green State
is dependent on capital for taxes, and capital is dependent on accumulation for proﬁts (out of
which taxes would be paid), then how viable is a strategy of limiting overall accumulation?’ Such
an insight already problematises Eckersley’s anticipation of ‘enlarged’ state capacity.
Yet the calls to move beyond growth come at a moment in time when the state is also facing esca-
lating demands on its resources. This is partly due to the expansion of eco-investment by a Green
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State, but primarily due to rising welfare costs. Demographic changes mean that welfare budgets in
the post-industrial world – which constitute one of the largest components of state spending as well
as a budgetary priority of Green States (Christoﬀ 2005. p. 42) – are set to grow signiﬁcantly in forth-
coming years, particularly because of strains engendered by existing welfare commitments in the
areas of healthcare and pensions. The eﬀects of these demographic changes on welfare budgets
are manageable as long as growth is maintained, according at least to welfare state scholars
(Esping-Andersen 1996, 2002, Hay and Wincott 2011, Taylor-Gooby 2013). However, it is unclear
how policy-makers are to meet existing welfare commitments when they demand ever greater mon-
etary resources in a context where the ‘tax take’ is stagnating or diminishing. The post-war social con-
tract ‘was founded upon robust economic growth’ (Esping-Andersen 2002, p. 23), which has led
Fitzpatrick (1998, p. 5) to conclude that ‘social justice and ecological sustainability do not necessarily
go together’. To compound matters, one could reasonably assume that a post-growth transition
would have direct implications for other areas of welfare, such as demands for unemployment insur-
ance, income support and private pension funds. It is important to avoid determinism here, but cer-
tainly a post-growth transition would impose severe ﬁscal constraints on state spending just as
existing welfare commitments demand greater expenditure.
A transition to a ‘Steady State Economy’ rather than a de-growth economy would to some extent
alleviate the constraints on state capacity, as the tax take would ‘only’ stagnate rather than contract.
However, even in a context where growth was stabilised, current levels of state spending could be
deemed to be ﬁscally unsustainable because the budget deﬁcits being run in Europe today demon-
strates that even present levels of state spending are not being ﬁnanced by present levels of tax
income. Already, state spending is outstripping tax income in a way that could only be acceptable
when it is possible to anticipate future economic expansion. It is tempting to think of these
budget deﬁcits as being a post-2008 phenomena but, with the exception of Canada, Norway,
Finland and Denmark which have run budget surpluses consistently in recent decades, budget
deﬁcits have become remarkably normalised in many post-industrial societies since the 1970s
(World Bank 2015). Worse, the capricious reactions of the ﬁnancial markets to a post-growth tran-
sition – should they be insulated from a Green State overhaul too – could also raise the cost of gov-
ernment borrowing and de-value national currencies thereby making the existing ﬁscal
arrangements of the state all the more unsustainable.
This is to say nothing about the repayment of the public debt accumulated by the budget deﬁcits
of previous years. Today, the repayment of public debt and the continuation of budget deﬁcits can be
justiﬁed as temporary counter-cyclical Keynesianism designed to revive the locomotives of growth
through re-generating demand and capital investment projects. It is a moderate concern for most
progressives as future budget surpluses enabled by growth will ameliorate the borrowing of
today. This macroeconomic logic will be discredited by the end of growth (Bailey 2015).3 It is uncon-
tested here that public debt has been fetishised since 2009, but in a post-growth transition the Key-
nesian macroeconomic logic which allows us to be sanguine about debt repayments and budget
deﬁcits no longer holds. With all this in mind, ‘not only is future spending predicated on economic
expansion, but current levels of spending are based on assumptions of future expansion as well’
(Bailey 2015, p. 798).
Domestic politics will play a key role in determining where remaining capital is allocated, but the
structural ﬁscal constraints imposed upon Green State policy-makers in a post-growth context are
clear. Debt repayments, welfare commitments and other areas of government expenditure will
compete with environmental projects for scarce governmental resources in conditions of pareto
optimality or state atrophy. Some forms of taxation may mitigate the growing gulf between the stag-
nating tax take – although there are signiﬁcant limits to even progressive architectures of taxation
when the very point of a post-growth economy is to circumscribe economic activity – but we
could certainly anticipate severe consequences for the ﬁscal capacity of the state. In all likelihood
the level of austerity demanded by a post-growth transition would far exceed the level of austerity
experienced already since 2008 (Bailey 2015).
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For the Green State to be truly ‘green’ it may need to accept the strong ecological modernisation
impulse to de-prioritise GDP growth (Jackson 2009, Anderson and Bows-Larkin 2012, IPCC 2014,
Jackson and Webster 2016). Yet, simultaneously, the Green State will be diﬃcult to operationalise
without the ﬁscal capacity enabled by growth. How are the Green State’s institutional mechanisms
of eﬀecting environmentally-judicious change to be ﬁnanced?
This critique complements the scepticism about the state’s ability to rid itself of its functional
imperative to pursue the interests of private capital given the long-term evolution of the state’s insti-
tutional set-up, articulated by Hay (1996), Paterson (2016) and Dryzek (1992). Their institutionalist
analysis proﬀered the argument that the ideas embedded into state institutions – which are not
immutable but are nevertheless fundamental to what institutions actually are – will continue to per-
ipheralise environmental objectives. Paterson believes that ‘detaching a growth imperative from the
state is impossible to imagine’, as the state and capitalism are co-constitutive, based on his ontologi-
cal contention of a ‘structural relationship between capitalism, growth and the state’ (Paterson 2016,
p. 479).
As James O’Connor (1973) rightly acknowledged, the state’s attempts to redress negative ‘market
externalities’ through welfare expenditure and environmental projects (and secure its own legitimacy
in doing so) have formed part of a governance strategy to manage these tensions. The paradox
O’Connor identiﬁes between the state’s simultaneous commitments to promoting the interests of
capital and assuaging the manifestations of its social and environmental consequences does not,
however, disappear as much as mutate in the context of moving beyond growth. This analysis
thus dovetails with the accusation posed by Paterson (2007, p. 549) that Green State scholarship
takes the issues of capitalism very lightly. Certainly this analysis points to the precarious fault lines
upon which Green States sit and the limits of capitalist relations.
The political economy of the state as we move beyond growth remains theoretically under-devel-
oped in the post-growth as well as the Green State literature. Many authors who depict a post-growth
economy continue to posit a large and interventionist role for the state (Victor 2008, Jackson 2009). It
is clear, however, that if we adhere to the ceteris paribus mechanisms and constraints of state
ﬁnancing, such a transition would have profound consequences for the ﬁscal capacity of the state.
This would have direct eﬀects upon the state’s long-held status as being the instrument of progress-
ive politics, a position echoed by Eckersley and Christoﬀ.
The Green State, of course, was partly a response to the anti-statist tradition within the Green
movement; the most notable exponents being Murray Bookchin (1980, 1982), Giorgos Kallis
(2012), Joan Martínez-Alier (2009). In some sense, this critique may be seen as reinforcing their antip-
athy toward the state. Indeed, although it takes a diﬀerent analytical route, it may even provoke the
same question posed by Thom Kuehls (2014, p. 243): does a truly environmental politics mean the
end of the state? Is the very notion of a Green State in some sense oxymoronic? Yet, Eckersley is
right that the state – or at least some institutions within it – is a crucial vehicle for addressing environ-
mental unsustainability, unrivalled in terms of existing capacity and legitimacy. Some state actors and
actions not only can, but do, serve to mitigate ecological problems and facilitate the adaptation of
societal structures to a greener age in ways which reﬂect green values of social justice, redistribution
and regulation (Meadowcroft 2005b). As such, it is imperative that moving ‘beyond growth’ does not
entail the ﬁscal erosion of the state if there is to be an eﬀective Green State as Eckersley envisaged it.
Interrogating the Capitalist Concepts which Constitute the Constraints
This proposition of an interventionist state that is moving beyond growth presents a contradiction for
the Green State literature to contemplate. However, a way of transcending such a contradiction may
have been signposted by Eckersley herself. Eckersley’s ‘critical constructivist’ approach is relevant
here as it shuns functionalist analyses and recognises the ‘political and discursive struggles over
the contested meanings, purposes and functions of social institutions’ (Eckersley 2004, p. 62). It is
an approach that provides an open-ended framework for interrogating deep-seated structural
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socio-economic conventions, and thus enables us to contemplate a degree of systematic transform-
ation; quite in contrast to the weaker forms of Ecological Modernisation. Critical constructivism, there-
fore, serves as a useful analytical method of contesting the ceteris paribus assumptions made in the
prior analysis and rendering the aforementioned ﬁscal constraints mutable through re-politicisation
and contestation. The constraints outlined in this analysis are, after all, not objective or borne of the
material world. They are fundamentally ideational, even if they have long been de-politicised and
accepted as economic necessities. It is important to insist that what constitutes the constraints in
the prior analysis is simply a nexus of capitalist concepts, which can be subject to contestation.
Eckersley’s view was that the Green State must be a post-capitalist one if it is to achieve a ‘deep
and lasting resolution’ to ecological problems (Eckersley 2004, p. 81). The analysis presented here re-
aﬃrms that view, but it also demands that we go further than Eckersley does in challenging capital-
ism’s established conventions. To reiterate Eckersley’s stance, when pondering the question of
whether a ‘full-ﬂedged Green democratic state’ would still be a capitalist one, she stated with
clarity that:
On the one hand, the green state would still be dependent on the wealth produced by private capital accumu-
lation to fund, via taxation, its programs and in this sense would still be a capitalist state. On the other, securing
private capital accumulation would no longer be the deﬁning feature or primary raison d’être of the state. The
state would be more reﬂexive and market activity would be disciplined, and in some cases curtailed, by social
and ecological norms. The purpose and character of the state would be enlarged and therefore be diﬀerent.
In this respect, the green democratic state may be understood as a postcapitalist state (Eckersley 2004, p. 83–84).
Eckersley, then, put forward the Green State to be broadly post-capitalist, but she posited that the
conventions of state ﬁnancing were to be elements of the existing capitalist set-up that were to
be maintained. In spite of this, the state was to be ‘enlarged’. In contrast, I contend that the critical
constructivist approach must be applied to an additional sphere of socio-economic relations if the
Green State is to fulﬁl the role that Eckersley propounded. I contend that the conventions of state
ﬁnancing – with the typical practices of money creation and the viability of existing debt relations
in particular – must be re-politicised and challenged if we are to operationalise a state which is sim-
ultaneously robust enough to enable green change and move beyond GDP growth. De-privileging
capital accumulation is a laudable aim of Eckersley’s Green State vision and one which is cognisant
of the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between growth and environmental sustain-
ability, but without growth and under ceteris paribus conditions of state ﬁnancing the Green State
would suffer a ﬁscal contraction from the moment of its inception.
It is important to avoid drawing any prescriptive conclusions at this juncture, as there are numer-
ous paths – all with diﬀering degrees of post-capitalist radicalism – we can infer from the preceding
analysis. I would suggest, though, that the insights of two bodies of scholarship are particularly
germane given the analytical focus on state ﬁnancing, which together constitute a rather minimalist
route forward. An engagement with both literatures promises to be fruitful given their potential con-
tribution to a discussion on re-politicising the constraints surrounding the Green State.
The ﬁrst is the emerging literature known as ‘Modern Monetary Theory’ (MMT) that provides a
quite diﬀerent account of a modern state’s ﬁscal and policy space than orthodox economic
approaches based on a critique of conventional money production. Private banks, contrary to the
pervasive misconception, do not simply serve as intermediaries between savers and lenders, but
instead create money ex nihilo through issuing credit at interest. This has been recognised by
Keynes (1930), Hayek (1931), Schumpeter (see Michell 2014), Minsky (1986), Wray (2012) and recently
even the Bank of England (2014) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2017). Over 90 per cent of money cir-
culating in advanced capitalist economies today has been created by private banks (Di Muzio and
Robbins 2016) and is governed only at arms-length by Central Bank interest base rates which
shape the proﬁtability of private banks to lend (Ingham 2004).
MMT has partly grown in popularity because of the banking crash of 2007/8. Scholars such as Wray
(2012) and Bell-Kelton (2001) have drawn upon Minsky (1986) to contend that the modus operandi of
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money production is irrevocably dysfunctional given the destabilising eﬀects of credit cycles in gen-
erating ﬁnancial instability. Drawing on this tradition, as well as the belief that money ought not to be
analysed as a commodity with innate value but rather as a ‘social relation of debt and credit denomi-
nated in a unit of account’ (Ingham 2004, p. 12), a cadre of scholars has challenged the naturalised
understanding of money production and questioned whether it could be reconstituted.
MMT scholars particularly invoked the insights of Knapp’s (1924) ‘state money approach’ to argue
that the state could adopt a more prominent role in producing capital to better serve the public good.
The injection of money into the economy by state agencies is far from unprecedented, as the recent
bouts of Quantitative Easing – the policy of creating new bank reserves from the purchase of (toxic)
ﬁnancial assets – in Europe instantiate. Policy proposals such as ‘People’s Q.E.’ and ‘Green Q.E.’ (Ander-
son 2015, Blyth et al. 2015) both seemingly draw upon MMT ideas to advocate alternative injections
of capital into the economy. In sum, the case for re-thinking the balance between the public and
private sectors in money production so that it better serves social purposes is compelling.4
From a green perspective, re-equipping the state in this way can be seen as instrumental in bol-
stering investment in low-carbon infrastructure and energy systems, as it has been shown that
private capital is tendentially attracted to unsustainable, carbon-intensive industrial sectors (Di
Muzio 2012). However, it is just as crucial to transform monetary policy for social purposes. As
Martin Wolf (2014) notes,
the new money would be injected into the economy in four possible ways: to ﬁnance government spending, in
place of taxes or borrowing; to make direct payments to citizens; to redeem outstanding debts, public or private;
or to make new loans through banks or other intermediaries.
A greater role for the state in the creation of this Polanyian ‘ﬁctitious commodity’ would unquestion-
ably be conducive to the public good according to eminent green scholar Mary Mellor. She has drawn
upon the work of Marx and Veblen to argue that realising an economy which is both democratic and
sustainable is predicated upon tackling the inequities of ﬁnance (Mellor 2002, 2010).
In light of the ﬁscal constraints imposed by a post-growth transition upon the state under ceteris
paribus conditions, the notion of ﬁnancing public expenditure not through tax receipts or by borrow-
ing from ﬁnancial institutions (which currently create money ex nihilo) but rather by the state itself is
of great relevance to the Green State debate. The ﬁrst option identiﬁed by Wolf would do much to
address the trilemma explicated. Indeed, this is why Tymoigne and Wray (2014) claim that ﬁscal con-
straints are entirely self-imposed by ‘monetarily sovereign’ governments.
A monetary reform of this magnitude would certainly encounter signiﬁcant political obstacles; the
most patent of which would be retracting the independence of, and enforcing a new remit for,
Central Banks. Re-politicising the Federal Reserve in the United States and the Bank of England in
the UK in this way would prove diﬃcult, but the tackling the power of the inter-governmental Euro-
pean Central Bank in the Eurozone countries more diﬃcult still. However, there is good reason to
think that moving beyond growth – as demanded by strong ecological modernisation exponents
– requires such a reform. The current theory of debt-based and interest-bearing money creation
can be said to be predicated upon future economic growth (Douthwaite 2006, Eisenstein 2012,
Farley et al. 2013), and, as such, the very existence of a Green State which embodies both of its
key political economy characteristics could rest on tackling such institutional arrangements and
vested interests.
The primary economic criticism of MMT reforms are that nationalising the means of money pro-
duction could produce hyper-inﬂation, with Weimer Germany and Zimbabwe in the 2000s typically
cited as examples. Jackson and Dyson (2012, p. 302) contend that it is state corruption, rather than
state-led creation, which is the historical common causal driver of hyperinﬂation and accordingly advo-
cate the establishment of a Money Creation Committee (grounded in monetarist ideas of governmental
control of themoney supply) and a greater role for tax policy is warding oﬀ inﬂationary pressures. None-
theless, inﬂation represents a signiﬁcant threat to socio-economic stability and living standards particu-
larly in the context of diminished economic output which a post-growth transition would necessarily
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entail. Furthermore, national currencies could depreciate because of these changes – raising the cost of
imported necessities –making international coordination between Green States all themore important.
These threats perhaps signify the limitations of employing MMT ideas to mitigate the ﬁscally contrac-
tionary eﬀects of moving beyond growth on the state.
The second body of scholarship with potential insights for the Green State literature in the light of
the above analysis on the ﬁscal consequences of a post-growth transition concerns the continued
viability of debt relations. David Graeber’s seminal work, Debt: The ﬁrst 5,000 years, traces the devel-
opment of money as a means of quantifying and codifying debt. He outlines the varied cultural prac-
tices of debt across time, thereby contesting the depictions about the universality, objectivity and
non-negotiability of debt in contemporary political discourse. This is a strand of research that has
become increasingly germane since 2008 as political discourse has been gripped by debt fetishism.
There is a strong relationship here between the proposals for an alternative system of money cre-
ation and the scholarship on the contingencies of debt in the sense that, as Graeber (2011, p. 372)
puts it, ‘money has no essence. It’s not really anything; therefore, its nature has always been and pre-
sumably always will be a matter of political contestation’. He notes that it was formerly linked to the
limited physical stocks of gold – widely seen as a precious commodity with inherent value – but the
last vestige of the linkage between money and gold was eradicated by US President Richard Nixon in
1971 when he terminated the Bretton Woods Agreement (Graeber 2011). Since then money has been
backed by nothing but trust – what is known as ﬁat currency – and the implicit acceptance of the
populace that it remains the most optimal method of appropriating resources. Since Nixon de-
linked money from gold, ‘it has become evident that it’s only the wizard behind the screen who
seems to be maintaining the viability of the whole arrangement’ (Graeber 2011, p. 363). As such,
Graeber argues that the obligation to repay debts is underpinned primarily by pervasive moral
and cultural norms.
Yet, despite the pervasive moral compulsion to re-pay debt, many scholars have understood debt
relations as de-politicised mechanisms of exploitation and domination. Coming from the Marxist per-
spective, Susan Soederberg (2014) argues that the debt and the legal system buttressing it concealed
and ‘naturalised’ the exploitative societal dynamics in the relations of production through monetary
abstraction. Soederberg (2014) further contended that since 2008 post-industrial states have trans-
formed into ‘debtfare states’ in which a new form of governance has utilised credit instruments to
keep capitalism on life-support through the provision of additional liquidity.
This body of work challenging the non-negotiability and apolitical depiction of debt is important
here because of the pre-existing levels of indebtedness as well as the spectre of further budget
deﬁcits accrued by Green States. Ever high levels of government debt aﬀord a greater role for the
ﬁnancial markets in economic governance and subject state ﬁnances to the forces of credit
ratings, currency ﬂuctuations and ‘animal spirits’. This is why it is so important to explicate the con-
structed nature of this constraint on state action. As Andrew Baker has stated, ‘we should think of
money as a utility – a collective resource – created by human agency that can help us realise systemic
visions of the future, as a response to the choices, values and priorities of society as a whole. This is
what money can be for’ (Baker 2016). As Graeber (2014) has already stated, the Bank of England’s
admission (2014) on money creation undermined the very basis of the austerity discourse.
The notion of ‘debt audits’ have already gained a degree of political attention in Europe in the
midst of debt fetishism and the subsequent rise of far-right political parties (Financial Times 2015).
Molly Scott Cato (2014) has argued that ‘odious debt’ – a legal concept denoting sovereign debt
which has been incurred in ways which do not serve the best interests of a populace – ought to
be repudiated. Sandy Hager meanwhile, using the US as a case study, argued that the owners of
public debt constitute the new ‘ﬁnancial aristocracy’ who enjoy the upward redistribution of capita-
lising upon the state’s ﬁnancing of its budget deﬁcits as a proﬁtable revenue stream (Hager 2015). In a
post-growth context, public debt levels are posited above as one of the central reasons why even
existing levels of state expenditure may be ﬁscally unsustainable, even as state borrowing is partly
ﬁnanced by commercial banks who create money ex nihilo (Hager 2016). However, moving
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‘beyond growth’ demands an even more intensive critical interrogation of existing power relations
and inequities of institutionalised socio-economic relations.
We should not under-estimate the profundity of this agenda for change. To challenge monetary
policy and debt obligations in such a way is to re-imagine what the state actually is: an institutional
ensemble that could be ontologically separable from the capitalist market economy in delivering
public goods. The insights of these literatures, therefore, must be connected to the scholarship on
the Green State in order to address the tension between the proposition of familiar state capacity
alongside the ﬁscal constraints wrought by moving beyond growth. This oﬀers promisingly fertile
ground for future research. However, it must be noted that such a shift – as radical as it is – would
not necessarily mark the end of all ﬁnancial constraints. It can be anticipated for example that
policy-makers would still need to be wary of numerous economic variables, including inﬂation,
which could no longer be realistically tempered by interest rate rises. There are no silver bullets,
but – whilst being careful not to be too prescriptive – I would suggest that the above represents a
minimalist route to challenging the constraints facing a Green State. Alternative and even more
radical routes may also be deliberated in the context of this analysis, but the aforementioned consti-
tutes a useful if open-ended starting point.
Many of course believe that moving beyond GDP growth would necessitate the end of all capital-
ist conventions. Wolfgang Streeck (2014, p. 48), Serge Latouche (2009) and Joan Martínez-Alier (2012)
are amongst them. It is important here, though, to strive towards greater speciﬁcity given Eckersley’s
position on state ﬁnancing. The analysis presented suggests that, if the Green State is to maintain the
capacity of the modern capitalist state, then it cannot remain deferential to these particular capitalist
concepts in the midst of a post-growth transition.
Conclusion
This analysis – which focuses on the under-theorised implications of moving beyond growth for the
political economy of the state – only aﬃrms Robyn Eckersley’s contention that a Green State must be
post-capitalist rather than one born of ‘weak Ecological Modernisation’ (Eckersley 2004, p. 81).
However, for the institutions of the Green State to fulﬁl their envisaged role what is required is a
deeper re-politicisation of existing capitalist practice than even Eckersley advocated. Speciﬁcally,
there is a need to interrogate the capitalist concepts that would constitute its constraints in a
post-growth era. Such constraints – if left de-politicised – would belie any Green State’s ability to
enact environmental change as envisaged by its proponents.
The immediate concepts it is necessary to interrogate are those related to state ﬁnancing; the
means of money production and debt relations. Only when re-politicising these foundational capital-
ist concepts can we begin to discuss a Green State with the ﬁscal capacity to enact the environmental
change envisaged by its proponents. In other words, re-politicising these concepts is the minimalist
route to operationalising a Green State that has ‘high levels of state environmental capacity and inter-
vention, and of integration of economic, social welfare and environmental welfare policies’ (Christoﬀ
2005, p. 42). If the notion of a reformist state acting to protect environmental public goods is to be
validated in a post-growth context, then the profundity of the change needs to be recognised and
the insights of parallel research agendas concerning the ﬁnancing of modern states must be
engaged with.
Notes
1. Another dimension of the Green State concept is its demand for a transformation in its understanding of sover-
eignty to encompass a more cosmopolitan responsibility to populations outside of their territorial borders. This
article, however, focuses solely on the political economy of the Green State.
2. This duality is posited just as problematically in the post-growth literature by scholars such as Tim Jackson (2009),
Peter Victor (2008) and Peter Ferguson (2013) inter alia.
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3. This may be an unproblematic insight for the exponents of ‘weak Ecological Modernisation’. For these authors,
‘green growth’ is not seen as oxymoronic and can be achieved through technological innovations and a de-coup-
ling of economic output and ecological footprint (Hajer, 1995, Mol, 2002). It we accept the position of techno-opti-
mism as our starting point, as they do, there is little reason to move beyond growth to realise environmental
sustainability. For these authors, this analysis will be far less relevant.
4. Others go further and advocate a state adopting a monopoly on money production, thereby eradicating frac-
tional reserve banking and rendering banks simple intermediaries. Fontana and Sawyer (2016) have recently
oﬀered a rebuke of these proposals, arguing that the inherent monetarism of ‘Full Reserve Banking’ will com-
pound existing issues surrounding public expenditure, as well as fail to extinguish the ﬁnancial crises that are
endemic to capitalist economies and additionally shift power away from elected politicians towards unelected
Central Bankers.
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